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5 
A New Look at Judicial Impact: Attorneys’ Fees in 
Securities Class Actions After Goldberger v. 
Integrated Resources, Inc. 
Theodore Eisenberg∗ 
Geoffrey Miller∗∗  
Michael A. Perino∗∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Political scientists studying the judiciary have long been interested 
in what, if any, impact judicial decisions have on their intended 
audiences, particularly the lower courts that must comply with them. 
Compliance in this sense has been defined as the lower court’s proper 
application of standards the superior court has enunciated in deciding 
all cases raising similar or related questions.1 Most studies find 
widespread compliance in lower courts,2 with only rare instances of 
overt defiance.3  
This Article attempts to address three questions in the extant 
judicial impact literature. First, the existing studies use rather 
insensitive measures of compliance and thus may fail to identify 
instances of subtle resistance to higher court rulings. Justice 
 
 ∗ Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, 
Cornell University. 
 ∗∗ Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law, New York University.  
 ∗∗∗ Dean George W. Matheson Professor of Law, St. John’s University. 
 1. This definition of compliance is from G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE 
SUPREME COURTS 35 (1977). 
 2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 115–19 (1998); 
Sarah C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower Court 
Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POLITICS 534, 536 (2002); Donald R. 
Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda 
and New York Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297 (1990). 
 3. BAUM, supra note 2, at 116 (citing studies). 
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O’Connor once noted that judges “know how to mouth the correct 
legal rules with ironic solemnity while avoiding those rules’ logical 
consequences.”4 In many, if not most cases, lower court judges that 
do not like a controlling precedent have a number of strategic options 
open to them to avoid applying that precedent, including interpreting 
the precedent narrowly, distinguishing it factually, or disposing of the 
case on procedural grounds.5  
Equally problematic for the study of judicial compliance is the 
malleability of stare decisis. Under a strict view of precedent, lower 
courts are bound to follow the legal principles articulated by courts 
superior to them in the judicial hierarchy.6 But this doctrine can bend 
in practical application. Courts may exercise discretion in 
determining whether to adhere to stare decisis and may consider, 
among other things, social or economic changes that render a 
precedent no longer applicable.7 This raises an issue of classification: 
which decisions not to apply precedent constitute the appropriate 
exercise of judicial discretion and which are simply noncompliant? 
The ability of lower court judges to avoid precedents they do not 
like and the flexibility of stare decisis confound judicial impact 
studies, particularly because the variables used are often only weak 
proxies for compliance—for example, the proportion of liberal or 
conservative decisions following a liberal or conservative Supreme 
Court decision.8 With these kinds of dependent variables, judicial 
politics scholars recognize that researchers may often be unable to 
identify instances of noncompliance.9 
 
 4. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500 (1993) (O’Connor, J. 
dissenting) (quoting Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 907 (1991)). 
 5. Benesh & Reddick, supra note 2, at 536. 
 6. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 24–26 (1986). 
 7. Kenji Yoshino, Note, What’s Past Is Prologue: Precedent in Literature and Law, 104 
YALE L.J. 471, 476 (1994).  
 8. See generally Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court on Trends in 
Economic Policy Making in the United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830 (1987); Ronald 
Stidham & Robert A. Carp, Trial Courts’ Responses to Supreme Court Policy Changes: Three 
Case Studies, 4 L. & POL’Y Q. 215 (1982). 
 9. See Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of Appeals, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 35, 42–46 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (noting that 
existing studies have not found areas in which courts of appeals are “clearly defiant or overtly 
noncompliant,” but recognizing the fact that instances of noncompliance may have been too 
subtle for the empirical tests employed). 
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A second limitation in the judicial impact literature lies in its 
restrained focus. Judicial politics in general and the judicial impact 
literature in particular tend to have a “high court” bias. Scholars 
typically devote most of their attention to whether the United States 
courts of appeals or state supreme courts comply with the decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court.10 Comparatively few studies11 
examine whether United States district courts comply with the 
precedents of their circuits, even though most judicial activity occurs 
at the trial court level. Over the last two years, there was an average 
of nearly 326,000 civil and criminal cases commenced annually in 
the United States district courts, compared to about 63,000 appeals 
commenced—about 19% of the district total.12 During the same time 
period, the Supreme Court on average granted review in less than one 
hundred cases.13 A focus on high court precedents misses most 
instances where a court must decide whether or not to comply with 
controlling precedent. 
In addition to devoting most of their attention to the tip of the 
judicial iceberg, scholars studying judicial politics less frequently 
examine the ultimate consumers of judicial policies—the members of 
society who are subject to the rule the court has announced.14 This 
limitation in the literature is understandable; consumer behavior is 
typically much less visible than the behavior of the implementing 
courts and therefore much more difficult to study.15 Yet judicial 
decisions are only words on paper; the real significance of those 
 
 10. See Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political 
Science, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 18 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003).  
 11. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of Appeals 
Policies: An Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217 (1980); Stidham & Carp, supra note 8 (finding 
that district court opinions changed in a manner consistent with Supreme Court’s new 
direction). 
 12. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS: 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 85, 139, 208 (2008). Of course, the numbers 
are even more skewed than this. Within each case commenced in the district court, it will not be 
unusual for the judge to write numerous decisions, some of which may be subject to appeal and 
some of which will be effectively irreversible.  
 13. Id. 
 14. See BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: 
IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 92–114 (2d ed. 1998). 
 15. Id. at 95. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:5 
 
 
decisions can be measured only by examining how they affect 
litigants and other impacted parties. 
The data on comparative caseloads at the various levels of the 
judicial hierarchy raise a third question. If large scale compliance 
exists, what mechanisms drive it? It has become common to view the 
judicial hierarchy as a principal-agent system.16 Lower court agents 
subject to light monitoring have the ability to shirk, which in the case 
of judging may involve the district court advancing its own policies 
rather than those the appellate court prefers. The caseload data 
suggest a relatively small likelihood that any individual decision will 
be heard on appeal (much less reversed), a situation which might 
create prime conditions for non-compliance.17 Nonetheless, many 
scholars assume that, even when the likelihood of reversal is remote, 
fear of reversal plays an important role in keeping lower courts in 
line.18 All else being equal, a judge who is reversed more often may 
suffer a loss of reputational capital or reduced prospects for 
promotion. If these incentives exist, then one would expect that 
where the probability of reversal is higher, compliance will be higher 
as well. Yet some recent evidence raises questions about this 
argument, finding that there is actually little correlation between the 
likelihood of Supreme Court review and compliance.19 
The data analyzed in this Article allow us to address each of these 
questions (the appropriate measure of compliance, the impact of stare 
decisis at the trial court level and in the consumer population, and the 
mechanisms driving lower courts to comply with or resist controlling 
precedent). Specifically, we examine how the district courts in the 
Second Circuit responded to the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
 
 16. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy 
of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994). 
 17. Consider that, in 2007, of the 62,846 appeals that were terminated in the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals, there were only 2,393 reversals (about 4% of the total). In the same year, about 
326,000 civil and criminal cases were commenced in the district courts. Taking this latter figure 
as a rough approximation of cases available for appeal yields a reversal rate of less than 1%, a 
figure that would drop even further given that a single case may yield multiple decisions 
capable of appeal. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 12, at 85, 113, 139, 208. 
 18. David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower 
Court Compliance, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 579, 582 (2003) (citing studies). 
 19. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/3
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Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.,20 a 2000 case that 
mandated strict scrutiny by trial court judges of attorneys’ fee 
applications in class actions and admonished trial courts to seek 
“moderation” in awarding fees. Goldberger strongly suggested that 
excessively high fee awards had a much greater chance of reversal 
than excessively low ones. If federal district courts complied with 
Goldberger, we would expect to see lower fee awards and greater 
scrutiny of fee requests. We would also expect that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys would moderate their fee requests.  
How much can this analysis tell us about district court compliance 
generally? After all, fee setting in securities class actions is just one 
narrow legal issue arising in a specific litigation context. 
Nonetheless, studying this setting also has several advantages. First, 
the variables relevant to fee requests and awards have been 
thoroughly studied and thus we know a great deal about how they are 
determined.21 When combined with a large database of fee awards 
(approximately seven hundred), we have the potential for a much 
more precise instrument for studying compliance than past studies 
have been able to exploit, and therefore we have a much better 
chance to identify more subtle forms of noncompliance.  
Second, we have information about the ultimate consumer 
population—the plaintiffs’ attorneys in securities class actions. Civil 
procedure rules require those attorneys to publish a notice of any 
settlement and to specify the fee request they intend to make to the 
court. The availability of this information allows us to examine 
whether Goldberger affected their behavior as well. 
Third, the dynamics of this particular setting shed new light on the 
hypothesis that judges comply with precedent in order to avoid the 
chance of reversal on appeal. The Goldberger court suggested that 
reversal on appeal will be more common when a judge awards high 
fees than when the judge awards low fees. But, as is explained in 
 
 20. 209 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 21. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action 
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 27 (2004); Michael A. Perino, 
Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund 
Participation in Securities Class Actions (St. John’s Legal Studies, Paper No. 06-0055, 2006), 
available at, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=938722.  
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more detail below,22 in the average securities case, it is the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, not the members of the class, who are the most likely to 
appeal a fee award. Since they are only likely to do so if the court 
awards a low fee, district judges looking to avoid appeals and the 
potential for reversal have an incentive to give the attorneys precisely 
what they asked for—the exact opposite of what the Goldberger 
court wanted. It is only where settlements are very large that it may 
be worthwhile for a class member to undertake the costs and burdens 
of appeal. These dynamic processes yield a testable hypothesis: if 
compliance is tied to fear of reversal, we may observe greater 
compliance as settlement size increases. If on the other hand we 
observe compliance remaining constant or decreasing with settlement 
size, we might doubt that district court behavior in fee-setting is 
driven principally by reversal concerns. 
Our empirical analysis yields three primary results. First, contrary 
to what might be expected, Goldberger is not correlated with a 
general decline either in fee awards or in fee requests. On average, 
fees demanded and fees received by attorneys in the Second Circuit 
post-Goldberger are no lower than the fees they demanded and 
received earlier, or the fees in other circuits.  
Second, we find that, although Goldberger did not result in a 
wholesale lowering of fees, it did have an impact on fee-setting 
practices. Specifically, there appears to be an interaction between 
Goldberger and settlement size. As settlement size increases, both fee 
requests and fee awards rise at a slower rate in the Goldberger cases 
(later cases in the Second Circuit) than in the non-Goldberger cases 
(cases in other circuits and pre-Goldberger cases in the Second 
Circuit). The moderating effect of Goldberger in larger cases 
suggests support for the proposition that judges are responding to fear 
of reversal.  
Third, we examine the ratio of the award to the request as a 
measure of the scrutiny with which courts review fee requests. Here 
we observe the same general pattern. In some of the models, the 
interaction term is again negative and significant, meaning that 
increases in settlement size are associated with judges reducing 
 
 22. See infra Part II. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/3
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requests to a greater degree in Goldberger cases than in non-
Goldberger cases. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis 
that compliance is tied to the probability of appeal and reversal: 
judges knock fees down more frequently in big cases, where they can 
anticipate an objector’s appeal based on the argument that the fee 
award is too high, than in small cases, where any appeal is more 
likely to come from an attorney who argues that the fee is too low. 
Overall, our findings might suggest that district courts have 
complied only imperfectly with the admonitions of the Goldberger 
opinion: fee-setting practices, post-Goldberger, are not markedly 
different from those that prevailed before. Yet we would not 
necessarily interpret these findings as evidence of disobedience. 
Rather, our study suggests limitations in the simple principal-agent 
model of judicial hierarchy. Appeals courts like the Second Circuit 
see attorneys’ fees issues in securities class action cases only rarely; 
district courts—especially in New York City—face them on a regular 
basis.23 Our data are consistent with a view of Goldberger, not as 
conveying definitive orders from higher authority, but rather as an 
invitation to a dialogue: a request that the district courts which have 
regular exposure to the issues think harder when awarding attorneys’ 
fees and report back (through subsequent appeals) on the results of 
that reconsideration. So viewed, our study suggests that the district 
courts may be complying with that broader mandate to reconsider and 
report, and that their consensus view, after due deliberation, is that 
the pre-Goldberger approach to the determination of fees in securities 
class action cases reflected a reasonable accommodation of the 
competing policies of incentivizing class counsel and protecting the 
class against excessive awards. 
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Part I 
describes fee awards generally and the Goldberger decision. The 
section also articulates a number of testable hypotheses concerning 
the impact of Goldberger. Part II describes how the dataset used in 
the analysis was constructed and specifies how the variables were 
defined. Part III contains the empirical analysis. Part IV discusses 
these results. A brief conclusion follows. 
 
 23. See Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 945 F.2d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 1991) (“District courts are 
far better suited than appellate courts to assess a reasonable fee in light of the case’s history.”). 
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I. ATTORNEYS’ FEE AWARDS AND THE DECISION IN GOLDBERGER V. 
INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC. 
Goldberger was a securities class action growing out of the junk 
bond scandal involving Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., and 
Michael Milken.24 The defendant, Integrated Resources, Inc., was a 
diversified financial services company that allegedly participated in 
fraudulent transactions Drexel and Milken orchestrated, resulting in 
millions of dollars of losses to its shareholders.25 After complicated 
litigation, plaintiffs’ lead counsel reached settlements with several 
defendants totaling approximately $54.1 million.26 Because fees 
come out of the common fund created for the benefit of the class,27 
and because lawyers are invariably paid on a contingency basis, fee 
determinations put the class and the lawyers in a potentially 
adversarial relationship. For this reason, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure require courts to approve any fee award to counsel.28  
The plaintiffs’ law firm in the case requested an attorneys’ fee 
award equal to 25% of this amount, a bit higher than fees in similarly 
sized cases,29 but not an unusual figure for a securities class action at 
that time. The district court judge referred the matter to a special 
master who concluded that the proposed fee was reasonable as a 
percent of the recovery and recommended that the request be granted 
in full. The court, however, returned the issue to the special master 
with directions that the fee be recalculated according to what is 
known as the “lodestar approach.”30 Applying this methodology, the 
special master reviewed counsel’s records, cited numerous instances 
in which those records were incomplete or conflicting, rejected 
charges it found to be excessive, and recommended a substantially 
 
 24. For a general overview, see JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991). 
 25. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 45.  
 26. Id. at 45–46. 
 27. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980). 
 28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 29. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 53. 
 30. The lodestar method requires the court to calculate the product of counsel’s reasonable 
hours and reasonable hourly rate and then to adjust this figure (the “lodestar”) to account for 
other factors, including (in non-fee-shifting cases) counsel’s perceived contingency risk. The 
adjustment factor is commonly referred to as a “multiplier” because it represents a multiple 
(sometimes a fractional multiple) of the lodestar fee. See id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/3
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lower award. Ultimately, class counsel received $2,150,030, equal to 
just 3.97% of the total recovery and only about 16% of what the law 
firm had requested. 
Counsel appealed the fee award to the Second Circuit, which 
affirmed the district court’s order. Reaching far beyond the analysis 
needed to resolve the case before it, the appeals court issued a 
sweeping opinion that seemed to rewrite the rulebook on attorneys’ 
fees in the circuit. The court started at first principles. Class members 
are uninformed and disorganized, and thus are unable either to 
negotiate fees with counsel on the basis of equal bargaining power or 
effectively to resist exorbitant fee demands at settlement.31 
Accordingly, they are vulnerable to having an excessive share of their 
recoveries expropriated by counsel. These structural problems require 
the court to act as “guardian” or “fiduciary” of the class with respect 
to fees.32 
In the exercise of this “jealous regard” for class interests,33 the 
trial court’s “overarching” goal34 should be “moderation.”35 The court 
used the term “moderation” three times—once even in italics. Given 
the court’s approval in this case of a less than 4% fee, the term 
“moderation” seemed to be a clear signal that fees should generally 
be lower than those that district courts had been granting. This 
interpretation seems particularly strong given the concerns the court 
raised regarding the issue of contingency risk. The court confessed to 
a “nagging suspicion” that attorneys are “routinely overcompensated” 
for this factor in securities class actions.36 Because most such cases 
settle, counsel has a high probability of obtaining a fee.37 
Accordingly, while courts are not precluded from taking contingency 
risk into account in awarding fees, the Goldberger court declared that 
 
 31. Id. at 52. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 53. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. at 52–53. 
 36. Id. at 57. 
 37. Id. at 52 (citing Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of 
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 578 (1991)). 
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it is not appropriate to start from the assumption that such risk is 
present.38  
The court’s directive to moderate fees was not merely hortatory. 
The Second Circuit warned that judges who fail to limit fees—who 
instead passively grant exorbitant fee requests from counsel—face 
significant prospects of reversal on appeal: “we have not hesitated to 
reverse where we felt an improper appraisal of these factors led to 
overcompensation.”39 On the other hand, judges who erred by 
slashing fees faced little risk of reversal: “this Court has never found 
that a district court abused its discretion by awarding in a common 
fund case a fee that counsel assailed as too stingy.”40  
It is not clear how effective this warning would be in convincing 
district judges to reduce fees. To see this, think about the economics 
of the typical securities class action. Since the determination of the 
award is simply about the allocation of the settlement between the 
class and the attorney, defendants can be expected to be indifferent to 
the outcome of the fee question and therefore extremely unlikely to 
appeal any such award (indeed, it is far from clear that they would 
have standing to appeal given their lack of a concrete stake in the 
question).41 To the extent that there is any adversarial testing of the 
fee award, it typically comes from members of the class who object 
to the requested fee. Objectors, however, are relatively rare in 
securities class actions.42 Rarer still are appeals from class members 
 
 38. Goldberger, 209 F.3d at 52. 
 39. Id. at 53. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES, 
108 F.R.D. 237, 266 (1985) (“Since the defendant is interested only in the total size of its 
liability, so long as the settlement is accepted, it often will be indifferent as to the division of 
the fund between plaintiffs’ recovery and the attorneys’ fees.”). 
 42. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How 
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 
2053, 2066 (1995). Eisenberg and Miller’s empirical study of all reported class action 
settlements over a ten-year period found that the median number of objectors in securities cases 
was zero. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class 
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1550 (2004). In an 
empirical study of class actions in four district courts, researchers at the Federal Judicial Center 
found that in 42% to 64% of the cases analyzed there were no objections to settlements. 
THOMAS E. WILLGING, LAURAL L. HOOPER & ROBERT J. NIEMIC, EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS 
ACTIONS IN FOUR DISTRICT COURTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
RULES 57 (1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/3
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because, here too, they would have to bear the costs of appeal but 
would in most instances only reap a small benefit from a reduction in 
fees.43  
In the typical case, the most likely appellant would seem to be, as 
in Goldberger, the disappointed law firm that received a lower fee 
than it asked for. A district court bent on avoiding reversal of its fee 
awards has a simple strategy to avoid appeals and thus the possibility 
of reversal: give the law firm what it wants. These dynamics would 
only seem to change as the size of the settlement at issue increases. 
With larger settlements, any percentage decrease in the fee awarded 
represents a much more substantial amount of money for the class. 
For very large cases, the prospect of a fee reduction may be 
sufficiently attractive that it substantially increases the likelihood that 
a class member will be willing to undertake the costs and risks of 
appeal. This increased likelihood of appeal should make the court’s 
warnings in Goldberger about the risk of reversal more potent to both 
the lawyers asking for a fee and the court deciding what that fee 
should be. 
The language of Goldberger and the dynamics of securities class 
actions thus provide a useful setting for testing how closely lower 
courts comply with the wishes of superior courts, whether individuals 
outside the judiciary modify their behavior in light of such 
pronouncements, and how much if any role risk of reversal plays in 
such compliance. If courts or attorneys conformed their behavior to 
the policies the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dictated even 
when the possibility of reversal was low, then, all else being equal, 
we should see both fee awards and requests that are consistently 
lower across cases. In other words, Goldberger should be negatively 
correlated with both fee awards and fee requests. If, by contrast, the 
impact of Goldberger on awards or requests varies with settlement 
size, then this would suggest that compliance is linked to the 
probability of appeal and possibility of reversal. 
We can also test lower court compliance with Goldberger by 
examining whether Goldberger is correlated with the scrutiny with 
which the district judge reviews the fee request, here measured by the 
 
 43. WILLGING ET AL., supra note 42, at 81–82. 
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ratio of the fee awarded to the fee requested. We should observe the 
same pattern. If compliance is unrelated to fear of reversal, then 
Goldberger should be negative and significant. A finding that the 
ratio varies with settlement size would be consistent with the 
hypothesis that fear of reversal plays a role in compliance.  
II. THE DATA 
Analysis of these hypotheses began with a dataset of 717 
settlements in federal securities class actions filed from 1984 through 
2005 and settled from 1991 through 2007. Settlements were 
identified using Institutional Shareholder Service’s Securities Class 
Action Services’ database (“ISS”), a preexisting database of 
securities class action settlements, and from two newsletters, 
Securities Class Action Alert and Class Action Reports, that provide 
information on legal decisions and settlements in class action 
lawsuits. Collectively, these sources appear to provide 
comprehensive coverage of securities class action settlements.  
For these cases, data were collected on variables that past studies 
have shown are correlated with fee amounts44 or that have been 
studied in the judicial politics literature on compliance. These data 
fall into two broad categories: (1) data on case settlement 
characteristics, and (2) data on case characteristics.  
Settlement characteristics were coded using data from ISS, the 
Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (“SSCAC”), 
Securities Class Action Alert, Class Action Reports, and the federal 
courts’ Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (“CM/ECF”) and 
PACER systems. For each case, data were collected on the size of the 
settlement, the attorneys’ fee request (Fee Request), and the district 
court’s fee award (Fee). These were measured both as a percentage of 
the settlement and in inflation-adjusted 2005 dollars. Cases were 
coded “1” if they were decided in the Second Circuit after the 
Goldberger decision and “0” otherwise (Goldberger). 
Data on case characteristics came from a variety of sources, 
including published judicial decisions, settlement notices, media 
articles, SSCAC, and docket sheets and court filings available 
 
 44. These studies are discussed in more detail in Perino, supra note 21. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/3
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through the CM/ECF and PACER systems. We coded the number of 
docket entries in the case (Docket Entries) and the age of the case (in 
years) from first filing until settlement (Age), both of which serve as 
proxies for case complexity and litigation effort. Data were also 
collected on the presence of an SEC or other governmental action 
(Government Action) involving the same allegations at issue in the 
securities class action, which may serve as a proxy for case quality. A 
Government Action may also suggest that less litigation effort was 
necessary to achieve the settlement, possibly resulting in lower fees. 
Past research has shown that the presence of a public pension fund 
as a lead plaintiff (Public Pension) is correlated with lower fees and 
fee requests.45 Research has also shown that cases involving a 
particular firm, Milberg Weiss (Milberg Weiss), had significantly 
higher fee requests and fee awards. High profile class actions may 
result in lower fee awards, all else being equal, because they may 
involve relatively obvious cases of fraud that require less litigation 
effort. The Article therefore defines an indicator variable (High 
Profile) that takes a value of “1” if the case is in the top quartile of 
estimated damages in the sample,46 contains an allegation of 
accounting fraud, and involves a parallel government action.  
A few courts have experimented with auctioning off the role of 
lead counsel (Auction).47 Although such auctions are rare and have 
been subject to both academic48 and judicial49 criticism, research 
suggests that they are correlated with lower fee requests and fee 
 
 45. Perino, supra note 21, at 12–13. 
 46. As a proxy for estimated damages, the Article uses the Maximum Dollar Loss 
(“MDL”). MDL is the maximum dollar loss during the class period alleged in the complaint and 
is defined as the dollar value decrease (in constant 2005 dollars) of the defendant issuer’s 
market capitalization from its peak market capitalization during the class period to the first 
trading day after the end of the class period. Past studies have shown that MDL is highly 
correlated with potential damages. Mukesh Bajaj, Sumon C. Mazumdar & Atulya Sarin, 
Securities Class Action Settlements, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1001, 1014 (2002–2003). 
 47. An early discussion, and qualified endorsement, of the auction idea is found in 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and 
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (1991). 
 48. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of 
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 727–28 (2002). 
 49. REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, 208 
F.R.D. 340, 372–85 (2002). 
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awards.50 Prior research has also shown that judicial experience 
(Experience) with securities class actions (measured here by the 
proportion of securities class actions filed in a district over a five-
year study period) is negatively correlated with fee awards.51  
To control for inter-circuit variation in the treatment of fees, the 
regressions include indicator variables for circuits, with the Second 
Circuit as the reference category. To control for potential changes in 
fee awards over time, indicator variables were created for each year 
in which a settlement was approved and fees were awarded. The 
regressions use 1991, the earliest settlement year in the dataset, as the 
reference category. 
Descriptive statistics for the dataset appear in Table 1 below.  
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Are Attorneys Fees Lower After Goldberger? 
We begin with a simple comparison of fees awarded in cases in 
the Second Circuit in which Goldberger was a controlling precedent 
and those in which it was not. As shown in Figure 1, mean and 
median fees in the non-Goldberger cases are 28.35% and 30%, 
respectively (measured as a percentage of the settlement in the case). 
These figures are significantly higher than those in the cases in which 
Goldberger was a controlling precedent (26.03% and 27.25%).52 
While this finding suggests some compliance with Goldberger, it 
appears that fees were generally declining during this same time 
period. Mean (median) fees in the cases decided across all circuits in 
the years prior to 2000 (the year Goldberger was decided) were 
27.63% (30%), significantly higher than the fees in the cases decided 
in the later part of the sample period, 26.06% (26.94%).53 Indeed, 
 
 50. Perino, supra note 21, at 29. 
 51. Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors: The Impact of Competition and Experience 
on Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions (St. John’s Legal Studies, Paper No. 06-0034, 
2006), available at Jan. 2006, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=870577.  
 52. In a t test of the means, the t statistic was 2.332 (probability = 0.021). A Mann-
Whitney rank-sum test comparing the medians yielded a z statistic of 2.777 (probability = 
0.006). 
 53. These differences are statistically significant. In a t test of the means, the t statistic 
was 3.0407 (probability = 0.0025). A Mann-Whitney rank-sum test comparing the medians 
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there is no significant difference between post-Goldberger fees in the 
Second Circuit and post-Goldberger fees elsewhere.54 So it may be 
that the lower fees in the Second Circuit following Goldberger were 
due to a secular decline in fees and not to compliance with 
Goldberger.55 Even if that were not the case, if we define compliance 
with Goldberger to require the kind of dramatically lower fees that 
were approved in that case (4%), it is hard to say that lower courts 
did in fact comply with an interpretation of the Goldberger decision 
as mandating lower fees across the board. 
Is there any evidence that the size of fee awards is linked to the 
likelihood of appeal? Figure 2A contains a scatter plot of the log-
transformed size of the settlement and the log-transformed size of the 
fee award (both of which are measured in constant 2005 dollars). 
Figure 2A suggests that the relationship between settlement size and 
fee awards is not constant in the Goldberger versus non-Goldberger 
cases. We can clearly see this in the two prediction lines in the figure. 
As settlement size increases, the fee awards in the Goldberger cases 
appear to grow at a slower rate than fee awards in other cases. It is 
possible that the few very large settlements in the database are unduly 
influencing the slope of this line, so Figure 2B excludes settlements 
in excess of twenty on the natural log scale. Although the differential 
relationship between settlement and fee awards in the two sets of 
cases is less dramatic in Figure 2B, it remains. These data suggest the 
possibility that judges in response to Goldberger reduce their fee 
awards, but only in the largest cases, perhaps because they expected 
those cases to be subject to greater appellate scrutiny and thus faced a 
higher risk of reversal. 
Of course, other variables might be driving that result as well. For 
example, if plaintiffs’ attorneys were concerned about the higher 
risks of reversal that Goldberger may have created, perhaps they 
moderated their fee requests in the largest cases. In other words, 
perhaps the apparent interaction between awards and settlement size 
 
yielded a z statistic of 2.874 (probability = 0.0041). 
 54. Mean fees were 26.07% in the Second Circuit and 26.17% in other circuits (t = 0.156, 
probability = 0.876). 
 55. Because fees decline with settlement size, see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 21, the 
observed decline in percentage fees might also be attributable to the recent increase in average 
settlement size. 
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is a function not of the judges complying with Goldberger, but of 
attorneys complying with Goldberger. To see if this might be the 
case, Figures 3A and 3B recreate the scatter plots using logged fee 
requests instead of logged fee awards. The same interaction exists 
here, suggesting that attorneys may have modified their behavior in 
light of Goldberger. 
To fully test the relationship between Goldberger and fee awards 
and fee requests, we ran linear regressions, with either the log-
transformed fee award or fee request (in constant 2005 dollars) as the 
dependent variables. The explanatory variables are settlement size 
and the other previously identified variables that are correlated with 
fee awards and requests. The regressions include year- and circuit-
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by circuit. 
Models 1 through 3 are for fee awards. Model 1 contains an 
indicator variable for Goldberger, which is positive but insignificant. 
The hypothesized relationship was negative, so there seems to be 
little reason to believe that Goldberger generally led to lower fees. 
Model 2 includes an interaction (Goldberger_Settle) that is the 
product of Goldberger and Settlement. The coefficient of this variable 
is negative and statistically significant. All else being equal, in the 
Goldberger cases a 1% change in the settlement amount yields a 
0.07% smaller increase in fee award than in the non-Goldberger 
cases. In other words, there is significant evidence that as settlements 
grow larger the fee awards in Goldberger cases grow at a slightly 
slower rate than the fee awards in the other cases. As a robustness 
check, Model 3 re-runs the regression on a sample that excludes log 
settlements of twenty or greater with nearly identical results. 
While these findings suggest some kind of compliance with the 
dictates of Goldberger, two features are notable. First, Goldberger 
seemed to call for a dramatic reduction in the fees attorneys 
received—the case, after all, approved a less-than-4% fee. The small 
size of the coefficient for the interaction suggests that courts’ fee 
awarding practices did not change nearly so much as a broad reading 
of Goldberger would contemplate. Second, a logical reading of 
Goldberger would seem to require those cuts to occur across the 
board. But rather than doing that, judges seem to award the lower 
fees primarily in the largest cases, which at least suggests the 
possibility that they were motivated to demonstrate compliance with 
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Goldberger primarily in the cases that had the greatest chance of 
appeal. 
It remains unclear from these regressions, however, whether 
Goldberger led courts to change their fee awarding behavior. Models 
4 through 6 thus use the same independent variables but substitute the 
log fee request as the dependent variable. Again we see in Model 4 
that Goldberger is insignificant, suggesting no overall effect on fee 
requests. But, as with fee awards, the interaction term is negative and 
significant. In Model 5, all else being equal, in the Goldberger cases 
a 1% change in the settlement amount on average yields a 0.06% 
smaller increase in fee request than in the non-Goldberger cases. As 
this coefficient is nearly identical to the one reported in Model 2, it is 
possible that it was the attorneys who changed their behavior in 
response to Goldberger, not the courts. The interaction is again 
consistent with the hypothesis that attorneys reduced their fee 
requests primarily in the largest cases—those that represented the 
highest risk of appeal.  
A somewhat different picture emerges from Model 6. Here, the 
interaction coefficient remains negative and significant, but is much 
smaller than for the equivalent model that tests fee awards (Model 3). 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that both attorneys 
and courts changed their behavior in response to Goldberger. 
Attorneys reduced their fee requests as settlement size increased and 
courts cut these requests slightly more. 
One final interesting result in Table 2 is with respect to the year-
fixed effects. Starting in 1998, the coefficient for each year in the fee 
award regressions is negative and significant. All else being equal, 
fee awards in these years were notably lower than the reference year 
of 1991. It is impossible to attribute the drop in fee awards to 
Goldberger, which was not decided until 2000. A more plausible 
explanation is the impact of public pension funds, which became 
increasingly active as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions starting 
at around that time and whose presence has been shown to be 
correlated with lower fee awards.56 Fee requests are significantly 
lower as well, although there the effect is not consistently significant 
 
 56. See Perino, supra note 21. 
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until 2000. While it is possible that the decline in fee requests could 
be linked to Goldberger, it seems equally if not more likely that it 
was the result of the overall downward trend in fee awards. 
B. Do Courts Scrutinize Fee Requests More Closely After 
Goldberger? 
To assess changes in the level of scrutiny judges give attorneys’ 
fee requests after Goldberger, we calculate the ratio of fee award to 
the fee request. Figure 4 shows the distribution of these ratios in the 
Goldberger and non-Goldberger cases. It shows that overall judges 
take a light touch when it comes to reviewing fee requests. In the 
non-Goldberger cases, attorneys received a mean fee equaling 91.8% 
of their request. In the median case, the attorneys received precisely 
what they requested. By contrast, in the Goldberger cases the mean 
ratio was 85.7%, with a median of 90%. These differences in means 
and medians are statistically significant,57 suggesting that judges did 
comply with Goldberger by more vigorously reducing attorneys’ fee 
requests. Here too, however, the degree of change is smaller than 
what the appellate judges in Goldberger seemed to contemplate. 
We look also at the mean and median ratios just in the Second 
Circuit before and after Goldberger. As shown in Figure 5, there is a 
slight decline in means, from 87.64% to 85.54%, although this 
difference is statistically insignificant. There is a steeper drop in 
medians, from 99.01% to 90.01%, although this difference is only 
significant at the 10% level. 
To better test the relationship between Goldberger and the ratio of 
award to request, we ran linear regressions, with the ratio of award to 
request as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are 
settlement size and the other previously identified variables that are 
correlated with fee awards and requests. The regressions include 
year- and circuit-fixed effects. Standard errors are again clustered by 
circuit. 
 
 57. In the t test used to compare means, the t statistic was 4.1763 (probability < 0.0001). 
The Mann-Whitney rank-sum test was used to compare the medians. The test yielded a z 
statistic of 3.460 (probability = 0.0005).  
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The results of these regressions are reported in Table 3. Models 1 
through 3 are for the full sample of ratios. Model 1 includes 
Goldberger without any interaction. The coefficient is negative but 
insignificant so there is no evidence that judges subject to Goldberger 
were generally more rigorous in their review of attorneys’ fee 
requests. Model 2 includes an interaction term to test again whether 
judges reduce fees more in the cases that are more likely to be 
appealed. Although the interaction term is negative, it too is 
insignificant. Model 3 excludes from the analysis logged settlements 
in excess of twenty.58 Here, the interaction term is negative and 
significant, which is consistent with the hypothesis that judges 
subject to Goldberger increase the scrutiny they give fee requests in 
those cases in which the likelihood of appeal is greater.  
As we saw with fee awards, there is some evidence that courts’ 
scrutiny of fee requests became more vigorous over time. In Models 
1 through 3 the year-fixed effects are generally negative and many 
are significant, although not nearly so consistently as in Table 2. This 
finding suggests greater judicial scrutiny of fees over the reference 
time period of 1991. But again, this increased scrutiny can hardly be 
the product of the decision in Goldberger because it begins before the 
decision, not after it. 
Next, we wanted to focus on the cases in which the court actually 
reduced the fee request, i.e. those cases in which the ratio was less 
than one. Perhaps among the courts willing to reduce fee requests, 
those subject to Goldberger gave even greater scrutiny to the 
proposed fees. Models 4 through 6 run the regressions on this sub-
sample. The results are largely consistent with the results for the full 
sample. Both Goldberger and the interaction term are insignificant in 
the first two models, but are significant in Model 6, which excludes 
logged settlements in excess of twenty. So this too provides 
additional support for the hypothesis that Goldberger’s impact was 
not universal but varied with the likelihood of appeal. The year-fixed 
effects are negative and become consistently significant starting in 
1996, well before the decision in Goldberger. 
 
 58. This is consistent with the analysis of fee awards and fee requests. As an alternative 
specification, the model was run excluding just six outlying settlements, those in excess of $1 
billion. The results are consistent with those reported in Model 3.  
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Taken together, these data provide some support for the 
hypothesis that courts in the Second Circuit complied with the 
admonition in Goldberger that they scrutinize fee requests more 
vigorously. Again, however, the increase in scrutiny is much smaller 
than what the Second Circuit may have hoped. Compliance seems to 
increase as the likelihood of appeal increases, suggesting that 
compliance is linked to risk of reversal. 
IV. DISCUSSION  
The results reported here are consistent with the hypothesis that 
judges’ compliance is tied to fear of reversal. Of course, other 
explanations for the pattern we observe in the data are possible. For 
example, Goldberger was decided in 2000, shortly after large 
institutional investors started to become increasingly active as lead 
plaintiffs in these cases. Large institutions, particularly public 
pension funds, appear to engage in negotiations over fees, and prior 
research has shown that their participation in class actions is 
correlated with lower fee requests and awards.59 While we control for 
the presence of such plaintiffs in the case, it is possible that 
institutional investor activism began to influence fee requests and 
awards in other cases as well. Indeed, we noted earlier that their 
activism might explain the general decline in fees we observe since 
1998. As institutions have been most active in larger cases, perhaps 
their influence is felt most strongly there, explaining why requests, 
fees, and scrutiny vary with case size. 
Another potential explanation for the pattern we observe is that 
judges may have read Goldberger more narrowly than we do. 
Goldberger was a large securities class action settlement of over $50 
million. Many of the Second Circuit’s pronouncements about over-
rewarding attorneys for contingency risk were focused on these mega 
cases. Perhaps judges took this language to mean that they could 
focus their efforts on the large cases, thereby explaining the pattern 
we observe. In other words, maybe Goldberger stands for the 
proposition that judges should rigorously scrutinize fees in big cases, 
exactly as they ended up doing. 
 
 59. Perino, supra note 21. 
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Our data are also consistent with an interpretation of Goldberger, 
not as mandating any particular behavior with respect to fees, but 
rather as instructing the district courts to exercise greater scrutiny and 
more deliberation. This interpretation is consistent with Goldberger’s 
rejection of “benchmark” approaches to fee-setting. In this view, 
Goldberger was a command invitation to trial courts to engage in a 
dialogue as to the proper measure of fees in securities class action 
cases. The district courts were, in effect, instructed to reconsider their 
prior practices and to report back (through appeals) on the results. 
Preliminary results of that process of reconsideration are now in. The 
consensus of the trial court judges appears to be that the preexisting 
practice was generally appropriate, even when viewed in light of the 
considerations set forth in Goldberger, but that fees in larger cases 
required some (albeit relatively slight) downward adjustment. This 
view of the data suggests that a simple principal-agent model may not 
always capture the full details of the relationship between trial and 
appellate courts: perhaps appellate courts sometimes behave more 
like senior partners in law firms than military commanders issuing 
orders to the troops. 
CONCLUSION 
Appeals court rulings should always be of interest to trial courts, 
but the Goldberger decision was especially noteworthy. The court’s 
sweeping analysis and broad generalizations, its approval of a fee 
which many in the plaintiff’s bar undoubtedly considered shockingly 
low, its rhetoric (which contained strong disapproving overtones 
about class counsel’s greed), and its repeated intimations that the fee 
demanded in the case was grossly excessive, all demanded attention. 
But how would the trial courts and the plaintiffs’ attorneys respond? 
Our study finds that fees have declined somewhat in recent years, 
but these declines appear to be unrelated to the Second Circuit’s 
decision. Indeed, we find that Goldberger is not correlated with a 
general decline in fee awards and fee requests. Instead, there appears 
to be an interaction between Goldberger and settlement size. As 
settlement size increases both fee requests and fee awards rise at a 
slower rate in the Goldberger cases than in the non-Goldberger 
cases. In addition, we examine the ratio of the award to the request as 
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a measure of the scrutiny with which courts review fee requests, and 
we observe the same general pattern. In at least some of the models, 
the interaction term is again negative and significant, meaning that 
increases in settlement size are associated with judges reducing 
requests to a greater degree in Goldberger versus non-Goldberger 
cases. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
compliance is tied to the probability of appeal and reversal.  
These findings are subject to differing interpretations. If 
compliance with Goldberger required plaintiffs’ lawyers to ask for 
drastically lower fees or district judges to slash fees dramatically, 
then it seems that neither attorneys nor courts complied in any 
meaningful sense. If, on the other hand, the case is interpreted in a 
more limited sense, as demanding that trial courts and class counsel 
carefully rethink prevailing practices, then the evidence we observe 
can be seen as consistent with the proposition that the relevant actors 
are complying with Goldberger by taking greater care in the matter 
of fees, even if the result of that process is largely consistent with 
prior practice.  
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APPENDIX† 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
  
Goldberger 717 0.215 0.000 0.411 
Settlement 717 49.079 7.029 271.143 
Fee Request (%) 702 0.295 0.300 0.056 
Fee (%) 674 0.266 0.280 0.067 
Gov’t Action 717 0.351 0.000 0.478 
Docket Entries 716 190.473 111.500 334.152 
Case Age 717 2.940 2.597 1.624 
Experience 717 0.060 0.049 0.041 
Public Pension 717 0.109 0.000 0.312 
High Profile 717 0.082 0.000 0.275 
Auction 717 0.018 0.000 0.134 
Milberg 717 0.490 0.000 0.500 
1st Circuit 717 0.056 0.000 0.230 
2nd Circuit 717 0.346 0.000 0.476 
3rd Circuit 717 0.064 0.000 0.245 
4th Circuit 717 0.025 0.000 0.157 
5th Circuit 717 0.052 0.000 0.221 
6th Circuit 717 0.046 0.000 0.210 
7th Circuit 717 0.038 0.000 0.190 
8th Circuit 717 0.022 0.000 0.148 
9th Circuit 717 0.264 0.000 0.441 
10th Circuit 717 0.024 0.000 0.152 
11th Circuit 717 0.063 0.000 0.243 
D.C. Circuit 717 0.001 0.000 0.037 
Year 1991 717 0.011 0.000 0.105 
Year 1992 717 0.017 0.000 0.128 
Year 1993 717 0.018 0.000 0.134 
Year 1994 717 0.021 0.000 0.143 
Year 1995 717 0.017 0.000 0.128 
Year 1996 717 0.061 0.000 0.240 
Year 1997 717 0.039 0.000 0.194 
Year 1998 717 0.047 0.000 0.213 
Year 1999 717 0.061 0.000 0.240 
Year 2000 717 0.103 0.000 0.304 
Year 2001 717 0.109 0.000 0.312 
Year 2002 717 0.138 0.000 0.345 
Year 2003 717 0.132 0.000 0.339 
Year 2004 717 0.103 0.000 0.304 
Year 2005 717 0.071 0.000 0.257 
Year 2006 717 0.031 0.000 0.173 
Year 2007 717 0.020 0.000 0.138 
Note: Settlement is in millions of constant 2005 dollars. Fee Request and Fee are percentages of the
relevant Settlement. Class Period and Case Age are in years.  
Sources: Institutional Shareholder Services, Securities Class Action Database; Stanford Law School,
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse; CRSP; COMPUSTAT; CM/ECF; PACER; Securities Class Action
Alert; Class Action Reports. 
 
 † Appendix does not conform to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).  
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TABLE 2: REGRESSIONS FOR FEE AWARDS AND FEE REQUESTS 
 Logged Fee Awards Logged Fee Requests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Goldberger 0.027 1.111 1.031 0.056 0.930 0.352 
 (1.17) (4.40)** (4.36)** (1.36) (6.43)** (2.26)* 
Milberg 0.061 0.056 0.049 0.059 0.055 0.042 
 (2.61)* (2.36)* (2.24)* (2.28)* (2.18) (1.82) 
Public Pension -0.173 -0.181 -0.170 -0.248 -0.255 -0.227 
 (5.41)** (5.35)** (6.50)** (5.72)** (5.77)** (7.70)** 
Settlement 0.936 0.955 0.970 0.972 0.988 0.986 
 (29.08)** (37.10)** (41.71)** (80.46)** (92.45)** (83.97)** 
Gov’t Action -0.001 -0.008 -0.003 -0.003 -0.007 -0.015 
 (0.05) (0.44) (0.17) (0.22) (0.70) (1.20) 
High Profile -0.127 -0.126 -0.115 -0.100 -0.100 -0.058 
 (2.18) (2.08) (1.83) (2.19) (2.08) (0.84) 
Auction -0.586 -0.616 -0.540 -0.575 -0.599 -0.632 
 (6.19)** (6.21)** (6.26)** (6.57)** (7.85)** (6.65)** 
Docket Entries -0.040 -0.040 -0.019 -0.044 -0.044 -0.026 
 (1.71) (1.75) (0.69) (2.74)* (2.82)* (1.46) 
Experience -0.482 -0.395 -0.370 -0.473 -0.396 -0.270 
 (8.72)** (4.73)** (2.73)* (6.43)** (3.91)** (2.14) 
Age 0.119 0.114 0.102 0.071 0.067 0.055 
 (4.83)** (4.58)** (7.05)** (4.17)** (4.01)** (3.06)* 
1st Circuit 0.133 0.130 0.060 0.023 0.022 0.020 
 (4.84)** (4.96)** (3.53)** (0.52) (0.49) (0.45) 
3d Circuit 0.152 0.140 0.108 0.084 0.076 0.077 
 (3.02)* (2.94)* (3.30)** (2.61)* (2.32)* (2.77)* 
4th Circuit 0.187 0.174 0.113 0.075 0.065 0.062 
 (6.55)** (6.35)** (4.37)** (1.53) (1.35) (1.14) 
5th Circuit 0.068 0.060 0.017 -0.033 -0.038 -0.016 
 (2.11) (2.03) (0.89) (0.92) (1.05) (0.42) 
6th Circuit 0.161 0.151 0.078 0.071 0.065 0.061 
 (4.27)** (4.14)** (2.91)* (1.62) (1.49) (1.52) 
7th Circuit 0.188 0.183 0.101 0.076 0.073 0.070 
 (5.92)** (5.57)** (6.13)** (1.58) (1.59) (1.50) 
8th Circuit 0.178 0.168 0.117 0.031 0.024 0.038 
 (4.55)** (4.61)** (4.86)** (0.75) (0.57) (0.91) 
9th Circuit 0.035 0.028 -0.036 -0.025 -0.030 -0.032 
 (1.33) (1.17) (2.33)* (0.62) (0.73) (0.75) 
10th Circuit 0.085 0.090 0.035 -0.089 -0.084 -0.082 
 (5.20)** (5.20)** (1.61) (1.68) (1.69) (1.67) 
11th Circuit 0.133 0.134 0.076 0.041 0.044 0.044 
 (4.92)** (4.90)** (3.90)** (1.02) (1.13) (1.08) 
DC Circuit 0.246 0.230 0.116 0.167 0.156 0.129 
 (4.84)** (4.41)** (1.64) (2.06) (1.82) (1.33) 
Year_1992 -0.111 -0.110 -0.116 -0.124 -0.120 -0.117 
 (2.42)* (2.65)* (3.11)** (3.68)** (3.85)** (3.92)** 
Year_1993 -0.286 -0.289 -0.125 -0.056 -0.058 -0.068 
 (1.51) (1.47) (1.19) (1.07) (1.34) (2.00) 
Year_1994 -0.151 -0.135 -0.121 -0.059 -0.050 -0.045 
 (1.81) (1.64) (1.48) (1.16) (1.05) (0.90) 
Year_1995 -0.040 -0.030 -0.031 -0.049 -0.041 -0.033 
 (0.95) (0.65) (0.68) (1.10) (0.88) (0.63) 
Year_1996 -0.117 -0.113 -0.119 -0.025 -0.021 -0.014 
 (2.23)* (2.27)* (3.37)** (2.13) (1.50) (0.75) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  A New Look at Judicial Impact 29 
 
 
 Logged Fee Awards Logged Fee Requests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year_1997 -0.178 -0.176 -0.197 -0.014 -0.013 -0.009 
 (2.01) (2.08) (2.72)* (0.94) (1.01) (0.69) 
Year_1998 -0.116 -0.116 -0.131 -0.052 -0.052 -0.045 
 (5.01)** (7.05)** (8.02)** (1.53) (1.87) (1.76) 
Year_1999 -0.153 -0.158 -0.171 -0.046 -0.050 -0.051 
 (2.96)* (3.62)** (5.15)** (1.25) (1.57) (1.45) 
Year_2000 -0.200 -0.195 -0.181 -0.115 -0.111 -0.108 
 (4.13)** (4.21)** (3.76)** (2.34)* (2.34)* (2.76)* 
Year_2001 -0.202 -0.197 -0.179 -0.109 -0.104 -0.101 
 (4.17)** (4.45)** (3.68)** (2.21)* (2.27)* (2.54)* 
Year_2002 -0.203 -0.200 -0.175 -0.129 -0.127 -0.119 
 (7.84)** (8.38)** (7.78)** (2.65)* (2.81)* (3.10)* 
Year_2003 -0.201 -0.200 -0.171 -0.126 -0.127 -0.123 
 (6.10)** (6.68)** (6.09)** (2.42)* (2.62)* (3.12)** 
Year_2004 -0.216 -0.206 -0.204 -0.161 -0.152 -0.163 
 (4.04)** (4.04)** (4.01)** (2.48)* (2.42)* (3.10)* 
Year_2005 -0.273 -0.267 -0.265 -0.215 -0.208 -0.214 
 (9.48)** (9.81)** (6.70)** (5.89)** (5.93)** (6.17)** 
Year_2006 -0.431 -0.413 -0.353 -0.320 -0.306 -0.245 
 (6.39)** (5.90)** (5.20)** (2.93)* (2.74)* (2.53)* 
Year_2007 -0.396 -0.392 -0.408 -0.345 -0.343 -0.382 
 (3.89)** (4.22)** (4.32)** (2.79)* (2.97)* (3.85)** 
Goldberger_Settle  -0.069 -0.067  -0.056 -0.018 
  (4.06)** (4.43)**  (7.07)** (2.21)* 
Constant -0.094 -0.396 -0.682 -0.516 -0.761 -0.806 
 (0.26) (1.51) (3.42)** (3.26)** (5.67)** (5.78)** 
Observations 686 686 674 702 702 690 
R-squared 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Note: All models cluster standard errors by circuit with t statistics reported in parentheses. Models 1-3 use the 
log-transformed fee request measured in constant 2005 dollars as the dependent variable. Models 4-6 use the 
fee request as a proportion of the settlement as the dependent variable. As a robustness check, Models 3 and 6
omit logged settlements in excess of 20. Settlement, Docket Entries, and Age are log-transformed. Settlement is 
in constant 2005 dollars. 
Sources: Institutional Shareholder Services, Securities Class Action Database; Stanford Law School, 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse; CRSP; COMPUSTAT; CM/ECF; PACER; Securities Class Action 
Alert; Class Action Reports. 
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TABLE 3: REGRESSIONS FOR RATIO OF AWARD TO REQUEST 
 Full Sample Ratios < 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Goldberger -0.035 0.113 0.406 -0.034 0.085 0.416 
 (1.04) (1.13) (5.30)** (1.74) (0.51) (3.20)** 
Milberg 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.008 
 (0.19) (0.08) (0.45) (0.64) (0.57) (0.97) 
Public Pension 0.059 0.057 0.048 0.090 0.090 0.075 
 (2.95)* (2.79)* (3.20)** (2.21)* (2.17)† (2.51)* 
Settlement -0.021 -0.018 -0.009 -0.027 -0.024 -0.012 
 (1.78) (1.51) (1.16) (1.99)† (1.57) (1.30) 
Gov’t Action -0.011 -0.012 -0.005 -0.015 -0.015 -0.001 
 (1.09) (1.18) (0.44) (0.81) (0.83) (0.04) 
High Profile -0.015 -0.015 -0.033 0.012 0.012 -0.014 
 (1.07) (1.07) (2.28)* (0.62) (0.61) (0.54) 
Auction 0.023 0.019 0.077 -0.086 -0.092 0.093 
 (0.40) (0.33) (6.01)** (0.75) (0.81) (1.48) 
Docket Entries 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.010 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.24) (0.49) (0.45) (0.95) 
Experience 0.015 0.025 -0.050 0.144 0.152 0.032 
 (0.59) (0.96) (1.11) (0.31) (0.33) (0.08) 
Age 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.021 0.021 0.018 
 (2.31)* (2.22)* (4.36)** (1.31) (1.30) (2.30)* 
1st Circuit 0.062 0.061 0.033 0.025 0.026 -0.029 
 (1.77) (1.73) (1.03) (1.44) (1.54) (1.15) 
3d Circuit 0.035 0.033 0.020 0.075 0.072 0.040 
 (0.81) (0.76) (0.55) (3.03)* (2.71)* (2.55)* 
4th Circuit 0.063 0.061 0.039 0.012 0.010 -0.050 
 (1.66) (1.56) (1.08) (0.38) (0.32) (1.04) 
5th Circuit 0.054 0.052 0.023 0.060 0.059 0.012 
 (1.59) (1.53) (0.73) (4.22)** (4.14)** (0.58) 
6th Circuit 0.049 0.048 0.020 0.041 0.040 -0.013 
 (1.16) (1.10) (0.51) (2.84)* (2.83)* (0.37) 
7th Circuit 0.055 0.054 0.019 0.103 0.103 0.044 
 (1.43) (1.38) (0.57) (4.63)** (4.64)** (1.31) 
8th Circuit 0.093 0.091 0.070 0.037 0.035 -0.031 
 (2.43)* (2.33)* (2.04) (1.25) (1.23) (0.48) 
9th Circuit 0.018 0.017 -0.008 0.013 0.012 -0.030 
 (0.58) (0.54) (0.31) (0.82) (0.77) (4.80)** 
10th Circuit 0.086 0.086 0.061 0.077 0.076 0.031 
 (2.67)* (2.64)* (1.96)† (4.17)** (4.43)** (1.51) 
11th Circuit 0.043 0.043 0.017 0.093 0.093 0.046 
 (1.24) (1.23) (0.54) (5.19)** (5.20)** (1.95)† 
DC Circuit 0.027 0.025 -0.013 0.112 0.110 0.040 
 (0.51) (0.46) (0.25) (3.50)** (3.40)** (1.00) 
Year_1992 -0.020 -0.019 -0.020 -0.174 -0.171 -0.163 
 (0.70) (0.69) (0.65) (6.17)** (5.55)** (6.42)** 
Year_1993 -0.096 -0.097 -0.035 -0.147 -0.148 -0.051 
 (1.00) (1.00) (0.58) (0.91) (0.92) (0.49) 
Year_1994 -0.050 -0.049 -0.047 -0.136 -0.133 -0.120 
 (1.06) (1.02) (1.02) (1.36) (1.33) (1.33) 
Year_1995 0.029 0.030 0.026 -0.025 -0.023 -0.010 
 (2.32)* (2.32)* (3.14)** (1.40) (1.24) (0.50) 
Year_1996 -0.075 -0.075 -0.080 -0.095 -0.094 -0.100 
 (1.84)† (1.86)† (2.20)* (3.67)** (3.71)** (7.28)** 
Year_1997 -0.131 -0.130 -0.139 -0.247 -0.246 -0.260 
 (3.18)** (3.20)** (3.46)** (7.74)** (7.85)** (13.84)**
Year_1998 -0.044 -0.045 -0.055 -0.203 -0.204 -0.228 
 (1.69) (1.63) (1.64) (13.45)** (13.66)** (6.40)** 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/3
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 Full Sample Ratios < 1 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Year_1999 -0.074 -0.075 -0.079 -0.169 -0.170 -0.177 
 (2.54)* (2.59)* (2.83)* (10.57)** (10.64)** (6.61)** 
Year_2000 -0.062 -0.061 -0.057 -0.133 -0.131 -0.119 
 (5.20)** (5.17)** (5.69)** (5.91)** (5.99)** (4.69)** 
Year_2001 -0.057 -0.056 -0.051 -0.143 -0.142 -0.134 
 (3.08)* (3.18)** (2.33)* (6.99)** (7.21)** (5.54)** 
Year_2002 -0.041 -0.041 -0.034 -0.158 -0.159 -0.145 
 (1.73) (1.66) (1.59) (4.01)** (4.05)** (4.38)** 
Year_2003 -0.054 -0.054 -0.043 -0.136 -0.135 -0.106 
 (2.06)† (2.05)† (1.95)† (7.28)** (7.19)** (5.43)** 
Year_2004 -0.044 -0.042 -0.038 -0.102 -0.102 -0.093 
 (2.05)† (1.91)† (1.89)† (4.44)** (4.38)** (3.39)** 
Year_2005 -0.046 -0.045 -0.043 -0.121 -0.120 -0.123 
 (3.96)** (3.63)** (5.31)** (3.61)** (3.63)** (3.20)** 
Year_2006 -0.079 -0.077 -0.076 -0.149 -0.147 -0.173 
 (1.89)† (1.80)† (2.07)† (3.79)** (3.70)** (4.41)** 
Year_2007 -0.033 -0.033 -0.016 -0.097 -0.096 -0.043 
 (1.24) (1.14) (0.69) (3.60)** (3.21)** (1.75) 
Goldberger_Settle  -0.009 -0.030  -0.008 -0.031 
  (1.26) (5.38)**  (0.68) (4.09)** 
Constant 1.229 1.187 1.062 1.273 1.235 1.076 
 (11.58)** (10.57)** (18.38)** (7.06)** (5.90)** (7.04)** 
Observations 674 674 662 335 335 326 
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.20 
Robust t statistics in parentheses.  
† significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
Note: All models cluster standard errors by circuit with t statistics reported in parentheses. As a robustness 
check, Models 3 and 6 omit logged settlements in excess of 20. Settlement, Docket Entries, and Age are log-
transformed. Settlement is in constant 2005 dollars. 
Sources: Institutional Shareholder Services, Securities Class Action Database; Stanford Law School, 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse; CRSP; COMPUSTAT; CM/ECF; PACER; Securities Class Action 
Alert; Class Action Reports. 
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Figure 1: Mean and Median Fee Awards (Second Circuit Only)
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Figure 2A: Logged Fee Award to Logged Settlement (Full Sample)
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Figure 2B: Logged Fee Award to Logged Settlement (Logged Settlements < 20)
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Figure 3A: Logged Fee Request to Logged Settlement (Full Sample)
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Figure 3B: Logged Fee Request to Logged Settlement (Logged Settlements < 20)
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